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Abstract I introduce seven criteria for determining the valid-
ity of competing theories for the original function of language.
I go on to present a novel explanation that meets all the
criteria: language originally evolved to teach kin. I suggest
that the use of symbols subsequently generated evolutionary
feedback at two levels, in the form of self-modified selection
pressures that favored structures in the mind that functioned to
manipulate and use symbols with efficiency, and cultural se-
lection on languages for learnability.
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Other apes do not have functionally referential alarm calls
(Hauser, 1996), and their gestures are neither deployed refer-
entially nor exhibit symbolic or conventionalized features
(Pika et al., 2005). The evolution of language seemingly re-
quired a shift in referential communication away from specific
isolated unlearned signals applied by animals to concrete
events in the present to a general, flexible, learned and socially
transmitted, infinitely combinable, and functionally uncon-
strained form of communication; something entirely absent
in the animal world (Fitch, 2010; Hurford, 2014).
Selective scenarios for how and why this transition to the
emergence of natural language occurred are bounteous: lan-
guage evolved to facilitate cooperative hunting (Washburn &
Lancaster, 1968), as a substitute for grooming (Dunbar, 1998),
to promote pair bonding (Deacon, 2003), to gossip about
others (Power, 1998), as a tool for thought (Burling, 1993),
or to fulfill countless other functions or purposes. The wealth
of diverse historical narratives is enough to leave some re-
searchers deeply sceptical as to the value of such theorizing
(Hauser et al., 2014).
Moreover, human language exhibits a multitude of distinct
functions, implying that, for whatever reason complex lan-
guage originally evolved, it would have been coopted for uses
unconnected to its original function. Distinguishing between a
genuine selective scenario and the subsequent exploitation of
what is surely one of human beings’ most flexible character-
istics is extremely difficult. Nonetheless, criteria can be de-
ployed that allow researchers to judge the relative merits of
alternative historical narratives on the original function of lan-
guage, but to my knowledge such criteria have never been
fully compiled, and have not been applied in unison. The
approach that I follow was pioneered by Szamado &
Szathmary (2006) and Bickerton (2009), who between them
sketched six criteria for determining the validity of competing
language evolution theories. To these I add one further crite-
rion of my own (Odling-Smee & Laland, 2009), to generate
seven benchmarks with which to evaluate alternative explana-
tions for the original adaptive advantage conferred by early
forms of language. This compilation of criteria is important
because, although individually most of the criteria are not
particularly constraining, taken together they comprise a
tough standard against which almost all of the proposed
accounts fail.
These seven constraints are: (1) The theory must account
for the honesty of early language. Human language consti-
tutes a uniquely cheap and flexible signalling device, allowing
humans to engage in ‘cheap talk’ in an unprecedented range of
circumstances. However, if words are easy and cost-free to
produce, why should anyone believe what others say, and
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what is the incentive to learn thousands of words if one cannot
be confident that any convey an accurate message? This con-
straint implies that researchers should favor theories that pro-
pose a context for the evolution of early language in which
there was either no conflict of interest between the signaller
and receiver, or one in which the reliability of the signals could
easily be assessed (Szamado & Szathmary, 2006). (2) The
theory should account for the cooperativeness of early
language. In many acts of linguistic communication, the
transmitter imparts information that benefits the receiver, rais-
ing the issue of what is in it for the transmitter. The successful
theory must explain why, at the time of the origins of lan-
guage, an individual would go out of its way to help another
individual by passing on information. (3) The theory should
explain how early languages could have been adaptive from
the outset. Bickerton frames this constraint in the form of a
‘ten word test’: a challenge for any account of language evo-
lution is to explain what could usefully be said in just a few
words. (4) The theory should explain symbol grounding.
There has to some means by which early words could acquire
their meaning, for instance, through pointing, imitation, or
some form of representation. (5) The theory should explain
the generality of language. Language is characterized by the
range and power of generalization that it confers. Humans can
transmit information about the past and the future, as well as
events or objects distant in space. (6) The theory should ac-
count for the uniqueness of human language. A compelling
theory of language evolution must explain why the context
that favored language in humans either did not arise, or did
not favor the evolution of language, in any other species
(Hurford, 1999). (7) The theory should explain why commu-
nication needed to be learned. Leaving aside the role of
evolved structure in language acquisition, human language
is learned socially. Given that non-human primate commu-
nication is largely unlearned (Janik & Slater, 1997; Fitch,
2010; Hurford, 2014), and changes at rates little different
from other biologically evolved characters, the question
arises: what was language needed for, that required it to
be both socially learned and rapidly changing? Theory sug-
gests that cultural transmission is favored in changeable
and variable environments, whilst unlearned behavior
evolves in more constant conditions (Bergman &
Feldman, 1995; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Feldman et al.,
1996; Stephens, 1991). This implies that the matters that
humans communicate about change at a significantly faster
rate than the focus of communication of other apes, and
raises the question of what our ancestors needed to talk
about that changed so quickly.
To my knowledge, there is no published hypothesis for the
original function of language that meets all seven of these
criteria. That is encouraging, as it implies that collectively they
constitute a tough hurdle that any credible selective scenario
for the evolution of languagemust overcome. Here, I present a
plausible explanation that does pass these tests: language orig-
inally evolved to teach kin.
While social learning is widespread in animals, cumulative
culture that ratchets up in complexity and diversity over time
is unique to humans (Dean et al., 2012, 2014). Theoretical
analyses have established that high-fidelity information trans-
mission is necessary for cumulative culture (Lewis & Laland,
2012), and teaching is a prominent means by which high-
fidelity transmission is achieved. I use the term ‘teaching’
broadly, referring not just explicit tutelage, or the teaching of
skills, but also the passage of declarative knowledge that re-
sults in learning, and a host of more subtle processes, includ-
ing the use of eye contact, joint reference and utterances to
help pupils to learn to what they should pay attention, or to
what a symbol refers (i.e. ‘pedagogical cueing’) (Tomasello,
1999; Gergely & Csibra, 2005; Gergely et al. 2007; Csibra
2010). Defined in this way, teaching is rare in nature, but
universal in human societies (Tomasello, 1999; Gergely &
Csibra, 2005; Gergely et al., 2007; Csibra, 2010).
Mathematical analyses reveal stringent conditions that must
be met for teaching to evolve, but show that cumulative cul-
ture relaxes these conditions (Fogarty et al., 2011). This im-
plies that teaching and cumulative culture coevolved in our
ancestors, creating for the first time in the history of life on
earth a species that taught their relatives across a broad range
of contexts. Further increments in the probability of teaching
come when the costs of teaching are low or can be offset
against the costs of provisioning, when teaching is highly
accurate and effective in transmission, and when there is a
strong degree of relatedness between tutor and pupil
(Fogarty et al., 2011). Given that an animal is teaching, adap-
tations that reduce the costs of teaching without diminishing
effectiveness, or that enhance effectiveness without increasing
costs, ought to be favored by selection. Should a character
appear that simultaneously both increases the effectiveness
and reduces the costs of teaching, then we might envisage that
it would be subject to strong positive selection, but, crucially,
only in a population of teachers. The more teaching contexts
in which the character could be applied, the greater its selec-
tive advantage.
Language is such a character. First, language is an extreme-
ly cheap way to teach. Telling someone where to find a food
patch is far easier than taking them there. Instructing a child
that the red berries are poisonous is more straightforward than
getting this across through other means. A simple Byes^ or
Bno^, or Bthis way, not that^, will allow a tutor to provide
helpful guidance to a pupil acquiring a new skill at low cost.
Second, language is an exceedingly accurate way to teach,
bringing a precision to information transfer that is virtually
impossible to achieve through other means. This precision,
combined with the efficiency by which language allows tutors
to cue their pupils onto relevant events as they occur, and to
provide instructive guidance during skill learning, means that
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teaching through language greatly enhances knowledge trans-
fer. Simple utterances that carry messages like Bpay attention^,
Bdig here^, Blike this^, Bfaster^, Bthis way ,^ provide invaluable
clues, helping the learner to focus in on what actions need to
be imitated, or where precisely new skills need to be applied.
Once an individual is committed to teaching, language is by
far and away the most efficient means to do so. That is why
almost all teaching in human societies occurs through use of
language (Hewlett et al., 2011; Tehrani & Riede, 2008). In
addition, language extends the range of phenomena that can
be taught, allowing knowledge of abstract concepts to be
imparted, the understanding of which may significantly en-
hance the pupil's performance, as well as instruction about
the past and future, and distant events or objects.
Theoretical analyses show that teaching is more likely to be
advantageous amongst close relatives than unrelated individ-
uals (Fogarty et al., 2011), and 2 million years ago our ances-
tors were living in small, kin-structured groups (Stringer &
Andrews, 2005). Humans may have evolved as cooperative
breeders (Hrdy, 1999), heavily reliant on ‘allomothering’
helpers (See also, Isler & van Schaik, 2012). The unusually
long period of juvenile dependence in our species helps make
the teaching of life skills to children economical, as the costs
of instruction can be offset against years of feeding and caring.
The quicker children can be taught to fend for themselves, the
lower the burden of childcare. Recent thinking on the evolu-
tion of early Homo suggests that increases in brain size were
coupled with increased tool making and stone transport, die-
tary expansion, and greater developmental plasticity (Anton,
2014). This means that there would be plenty to teach, as our
hominin ancestors subsisted on a broad omnivorous diet, reli-
ant on a large number of extractive foraging and tool-using
skills (Stringer & Andrews, 2005; Anton, 2014). This period
in human history was the dawn of cumulative culture, when
our ancestors first began manufacturing stone tools, and using
the flakes to butcher carcasses for food, and in other ways.
Here, then, is a setting in which teaching amongst close rela-
tives could be beneficial across a broad range of contexts. I
submit that language originally evolved to enhance the effi-
ciency and scope of this teaching. As a hypothesis, it sounds
plausible enough, but does it meet the seven criteria?
Firstly, if language evolved to teach relatives (Fitch, 2004),
we would expect it to be honest. No new conflicts of interest
between signaller and receiver arise in a teaching scenario.
The function of teaching is to ensure accurate knowledge
transfer so that pupils can acquire fitness-enhancing skills
and information. If pupils are relatives, deception or inaccura-
cy on the part of the tutor would undermine the indirect inclu-
sive fitness benefits that teaching provides to the tutor
(Fogarty et al., 2011). Provided early communication was ini-
tially restricted to that which was taught, the interests of trans-
mitter and receiver are broadly aligned. Plausibly tutor and
pupil (e.g. parents and offspring) might differ in how much
instruction they would like to see imparted, but what teaching
does occur is expected to be honest, as inaccurate instruction
is simply wasting the tutor’s time and effort. Likewise, the
cooperativeness of early language is readily understood: if
language evolved to teach, it emerged in a context that was
already cooperative. No difficulty arises in explaining why it
benefits a tutor to impart valuable information to a pupil, if by
doing so he or she teaches life skills to a relative in a manner
that ultimately increase the tutor's inclusive fitness.
How language could have gotten started in a teaching con-
text, and how symbols acquired their meanings (criteria 3 and
4) are also easily envisaged. Simple attention-grabbing com-
mands would do little to get most messages across, but they
have been proven to help to facilitate social learning. One of
the challenges of imitation is that the demonstrator's behavior
is a constant stream of actions, which means that what should
be copied is not always apparent to the observer, nor where the
relevant actions start and stop. Here, a simple verbal (or even
non-verbal) cue can be invaluable. This has been demonstrat-
ed through developmental psychology experiments, where
extensive data now show that adults cue the learning of babies
and young children with simple vocalizations. Such cues are
known to generate referential expectations in infants, trigger-
ing a tendency to follow the gaze of adults as they orientate,
such as shifts in the adult’s gaze towards the particular objects
with which the adult interacts, and facilitating joint attention
(Tomasello, 1999; Gergely & Csibra, 2005; Gergely et al.,
2007; Csibra, 2010). The use of such cues, and the resulting
gaze following and joint attention, are thought to contribute to
the infant learning about both the properties of objects, and
how they can bemanipulated, as well as the meaning of words
(Tomasello, 1999; Gergely & Csibra, 2005; Gergely et al.
2007; Csibra; 2010). At the same time, pointing, gesture and
movement can ground teaching utterances, to provide mean-
ing to unfamiliar terms. A tutor can exclaim Bhere^ at the same
time as pointing to where the stone must be hit. He or she can
mime digging with a stick whilst uttering the word Bdig^.
Utterances equivalent to Bno, this way^ can be emitted whilst
manually shaping the pupil's body movements. Experimental
findings demonstrate that this is not only plausible, but regu-
larly happens when children learn new skills (Tomasello,
1999; Dean et al., 2012). Hence, in the context of teaching,
how early language could have achieved symbol grounding,
and how it could have been of value when comprising just a
handful of words, becomes feasible to envisage.
The requirement that the theory should provide an expla-
nation for language's power of generalization is also satisfied.
Teaching through language, once started, could be applied to
multiple difficult-to-learn proficiencies, including extractive
foraging procedures, food-processing methods, and hunting
skills. Paleontologists’ investigations suggest that the diet of
Homo species was highly versatile, with our ancestors eating a
broad range of foods, including fruits, tougher foods like
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woody plants, and various animal tissues (Stringer and
Andrews, 2005). This broadening of the hominin diet is asso-
ciated with increasing reliance on difficult-to-access but nutri-
ent rich foodstuffs that required extraction from a substrate
and some form of processing. Often, this food processing
required not just tool use but prior technological manufacture.
The teaching of foraging, hunting and scavenging methods,
tool manufacture, food preparation and food-processing skills,
fire maintenance, and collective defense, some of which re-
quired the coordinated actions of multiple individuals, would
particularly have benefitted from verbal instruction. In this
way, a modest protolanguage would be expected to become
increasingly elaborate, and to generalize in a number of
dimensions.
The uniqueness criterion is also met. No animals aside
from humans (and perhaps their immediate ancestors) evolved
language because humans alone were engaged in extensive
teaching. In the absence of widespread teaching, no selection
for language to reduce teaching costs or promote teaching
efficiencies would occur. Only in hominins did language,
teaching and cumulative culture coevolve.
With respect to the question of why early language needed
to be learned, it is relevant to note that chimpanzees and
orangutans both have extensive tool-using repertoires, as well
as behavioral traditions that exhibit considerable inter-
population variation (Whiten et al., 1999; van Schaik et al.,
2003). Members of our genus are likely to have constructed
richer and geographically more diverse cultural repertoires
than contemporary apes, including tool-using and foraging
traditions, a perspective supported by recent archaeological
evidence (McBrearty & Brooks, 2000; d’Errico & Stringer,
2011). A shift from unlearned to learned vocalization suggests
an increase in the rate of change of features of the environment
that select for primate communication. However, an explana-
tion based on independently changing external conditions,
such as fluctuating climates, is not particularly compelling,
both because the scale of climatic change is too slow, and
because an external source of selection ought equally to have
favored extensive learned communication in other primates.
If, however, language initially evolved as an adaptation to
cope with self-constructed elements of the environment, such
problems are alleviated. From a comparative perspective, the
most obvious features to fit the bill are cultural practices, par-
ticularly tool use, extractive foraging and material culture.
Cultural practices are typically transmitted amongst close rel-
atives, are deployed to exploit difficult-to-access but nutrient-
rich foodstuffs, and are challenging to learn, making them
precisely those traits that would benefit from teaching. At
some stage in the last 2 million years, our ancestors began to
generate cultural variants (e.g. tools, foraging techniques, so-
cial signals, courtship rituals, medicative treatments, gestures)
at such a rate that they could no longer communicate about
their world without being required to constantly update and
elaborate communicative signals and meanings. If each new
tool, or foraging technique, or display, or treatment has to be
learned, and if, as the comparative evidence suggests, cultural
variants such as tool use are typically learned by young apes
from their mothers and older siblings (Whiten et al., 1999;
Reader, 2000), then language may have coevolved with cul-
tural complexity as a means of facilitating and enhancing so-
cially transmitted life-skill acquisition in young hominins
(Csibra & Gergely, 2011). Consistent with this hypothesis, a
recent experimental archaeology study demonstrated that,
across six measures, the transmission of stone tool making
improves with teaching, and particularly with language, but
not with imitation or emulation (Morgan et al., 2015).
Difficult though it is to be totally confident about any ac-
count of the selective scenario that originally favored lan-
guage, the hypothesis that language originally evolved to
teach, specifically, to teach close relatives, has many virtues.
The account explains the honesty, cooperativeness, unique-
ness and symbol grounding of language, as well as how lan-
guage got started, its power of generalization, and why lan-
guage is learned. The explanation meets all seven of the
criteria required of a successful account of language origins,
something that, to my knowledge, no other hypothesis has
done. If I am correct, language is an adaptation that originally
functioned to increase the accuracy, reduce the costs, and in-
crease the scope of teaching.
Naturally, the selective scenario for language only begins
here, and is likely to have been co-opted and amplified in a
variety of ways. Fitch (2004) has argued that language origi-
nated to facilitate communication amongst close kin (Fitch,
2004, see also Nowicki & Searcy, 2014; Smit, 2014), and I
endorse this position. In the kin-structured groups exhibited
by our ancestors, early language, initially selected as an ad-
junct to the teaching of young by parents or siblings, could
subsequently spread to teaching more distant relatives. This
expansion would have been particularly relevant to activities
such as collective foraging, scavenging and hunting, which
required coordinated activity amongst multiple individuals.
Here, the direct benefits of ensuring that relatives possess
relevant skills and knowledge, in the form of enhanced forag-
ing returns, would compensate for the reduction in the degree
of relatedness amongst more distant relatives. Complex coor-
dinated actions are often difficult to bring off without a means
to teach, or tell, individuals what their specific roles should be.
In this regard, language would prove an extremely powerful
coordination tool (Sterelny, 2012).
Subsequently, with language, teaching could be extended
to support other established cooperative processes, such as
mutualistic exchanges, indirect reciprocity, and group selec-
tion (Fitch, 2005; Nowak & Highfield, 2011). I envisage a
transition of early language from its origins in teaching kin
to richer forms of language capable of supporting other forms
of cooperation amongst non-kin (Laland, 2016). Both
228 Psychon Bull Rev (2017) 24:225–231
reciprocal altruism and mutualistic trade (at least, the trade of
distinct, desired commodities) are surprisingly rare in other
animals outside of the context of kinship (Fitch, 2005;
Ridley, 2011). Trade seemingly requires some capacity to
agree a rate of exchange, something that would be very diffi-
cult without at least proto-language, or through the flexible
use of shared gesture. With the evolution of language, trade
becomes a possibility, whilst with trade comes negotiation,
and selection for still more developed communication
(Pagel, 2012). Likewise, Bfor the mechanism of indirect reci-
procity to work efficiently it needs gossip, from names to
deeds and times and places, too^ (Nowak & Highfield,
2011). Linguistically taught social norms allow humans to
institutionalize the punishment of non-cooperative individ-
uals, for instance, through policing or socially sanctioned re-
taliation, which theory and experimentation shows is a more
effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-
level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr &
Fischbacher 2003), and potentially support cultural group se-
lection (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich 2015). I agree with
Pagel (2012) that Blanguage evolved as a trait for promoting
cooperation^, but differ in suggesting that the origins of lan-
guage begin with a highly specific form of cooperation, name-
ly teaching. Other cooperative contexts, for instance, reliant
on reciprocity, trade and group selection, could certainly have
exploited a pre-existing linguistic capability, generating selec-
tion for enhanced linguistic skills. Such selective feedback
would likely have made a big difference both to the scale of
human cooperation that ensued, and to the potency of human
language (Pagel, 2012), plausibly helping to explain how early
language extended into domains in which honesty could not be
assumed, and vigilance against malevolence or incompetence
was required. However, other cooperative contexts struggle to
meet the honesty and adaptive from outset criteria described
above, and hence cannot be how language got started.
Like others (Deacon, 1997; Bickerton, 2009), I suspect that
our ancestors constructed a world sufficiently rich in symbol-
ism to generate evolutionary feedback, in the form of self-
modified selection pressures that favored structures in the mind
that functioned to manipulate and use those symbols with effi-
ciency (Rilling et al., 2008; Schenker et al., 2010; Erwin et al.,
2010). This feedback is variously cast as manifestations of the
Baldwin effect (Deacon, 1997) or of niche construction
(Bickerton, 2009; Odling-Smee & Laland, 2009). Selection
for more efficient and higher-fidelity forms of social learning
has favored the evolution of specific structures and functional
capabilities in the brain, in the process driving the evolution of
brain and intelligence (Laland, 2016). The syntax that we wit-
ness in contemporary human language is only possible because
of a long history, spanning perhaps 2 million years, of symbolic
manipulation in protolanguage, which constructed selection
pressures that, in turn, brought about significant changes in
the hominin brain (Hauser, 1996; Bickerton, 2009).
As the sheer volume of symbols that our ancestors were
required to learn the meaning of, and string together in unam-
biguous messages, increased, so it created the demand for
rules and conventions specifying usage patterns (i.e. one im-
portant aspect of syntax). If words are simply strung together
without syntax then ambiguities over their collective meaning
rapidly arise, creating a heavy processing burden on the re-
ceiver. Syntax alleviates this burden by breaking up the mes-
sage hierarchically and recursively into meaningful and read-
ily comprehensible chunks, phrases and clauses, that the brain
can easily and quickly process, and by introducing rules that
eradicate ambiguities. With this syntax came not just full-
blown language, but an almost infinite flexibility in usage.
Words have highly restricted meanings until they are strung
together, but in combination, underpinned by a mutually un-
derstood set of combinatorial rules, they are capable of com-
municating highly complex messages.
Language probably began as a means of reducing the costs
of teaching complex foraging skills, but will have become
coopted to teaching linguistic symbols too. Once early lan-
guage itself became something that was frequently taught (al-
though often implicitly, without overt tutelage), this in turn
would have generated selection for effective means of teach-
ing language to children, such as ‘infant-directed speech’
(‘motherese’) (Falk, 2004). Children are known to hear some
linguistic structures selectively and to ignore others, a phe-
nomenon that may have generated selection for language
structure that is Bchild friendly^ (Deacon, 1997; Falk, 2004;
Fitch, 2004, 2005). Infant-directed speech is typically slower
and higher in pitch than regular speech, and uses shorter and
simpler words. Studies have shown that infants prefer to listen
to this type of speech, that it is more effective in getting and
infants’ attention, and that it helps infants to learn words faster,
compared to standard speech (Thiessen et al., 2005; Fitch,
2010). The suggestion is commonlymade that language learn-
ing by children is spontaneous, or ‘instinctive’ (Pinker, 1995),
as if adults play little role. Such arguments underestimate the
important ways in which adults facilitate language learning in
children. Experimental studies show that the children who
learn language fastest are those who receive the most ac-
knowledgement and encouragement of what they say, who
are given time and attention to speak, who are corrected,
questioned, and spoken to in a child-friendly manner, and
who are exposed to syntactically complex speech at the right
time (Waterson, 1978; Huttenlocher et al., 2002; Thiessen
et al., 2005; Fitch, 2010). Important elements of infant-
directed speech, such as infants’ sensitivity to its linguistic
features, or adults’ tendency to engage in behavior that elicits
rewarding responses from infants (e.g. smiles), have been
favoured through a biological evolutionary process.
As protolanguages began to increase in complexity from
rudimentary foundations, they would have generated increas-
ing strong selection for cognitive adaptations that facilitated
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language learning and transmission. For instance, compared to
other primates, humans appear particularly adept at inferring
the meaning of the utterances of others (Bloom, 1997, 2000;
Fitch, 2010).While this ability is partly attributable to the afore-
mentioned pedagogical activities of the transmitter, an en-
hanced capability to extract meaning through observation of
others’ activities in the receiver is also likely. What is more,
the selective feedback from symbolic manipulation to the hu-
man mind likely extends far beyond the acquisition of a capac-
ity to extract meanings and comprehend syntax. Chomsky de-
scribed language as the main engine of thought, and there is
now little doubt that humans possess amind uniquely fashioned
to acquire and process information linguistically.
As the conventions of linguistic structure varied from one
(proto)language to another, and changed over time, the rules of
syntax would themselves have to be learned. Whether they are
learned through a dedicated language acquisition device, as
envisaged by Chomsky (1965), or through some more general
process mechanisms, such as Bayesian learning, is a moot
point. Either way, I envisage that the symbol-rich cultural world
constructed by our ancestors was amajor source of selection for
enhancements in language learning. Language is itself a pow-
erful example of niche construction (Bickerton, 2009; Odling-
Smee & Laland, 2009), a dramatic change that our ancestors
brought about in their (conceptual) world. Selective feedback
from language would have operated at two levels, a gene-
culture coevolutionary dynamic, where human cultural activi-
ties generate natural selection favoring enhanced language
learning and transmission capabilities, but also a cultural evo-
lution dynamic, whereby human cultural activities feed back to
affect the learned properties of the language.
Brighton et al. (2005) labelled the latter process ‘cultural
selection for learnability’. If linguistic structures are to persist
over time they must repeatedly survive the process of being
learned, expressed, and adopted by others. Children may ap-
pear pre-adapted to decipher the rules of syntax in part because
languages have evolved to have rules that are easy to learn
(Deacon, 1997; Brighton et al., 2005). The cultural evolution
of language has been studied through mathematical modeling,
and researchers have established that key properties of lan-
guage, for instance compositionality, could evolve in this man-
ner (Smith and Kirby, 2008; Kirby et al. 2007). Likewise, both
transmission-chain experiments and mathematical models
show how languages propagated culturally evolve in such a
way as to maximize their own transmissibility, becoming easier
to learn and more structured over time (Kirby et al., 2008). This
research is important, as it shifts some of the explanatory bur-
den for language away from natural selection for language-
specific cognitive adaptations, and makes the challenge of
explaining the origins of language more manageable (Smith
and Kirby, 2008; Kirby et al., 2007, 2008, 2015).
I emphasize that the above account solely addresses the issue
of the original function of language. I have said little to nothing
about how vocal learning, generative computations underlying
language, systems of semantic representations, phonological rep-
resentations, or the interfaces between these, evolved, and nor
have I explained how all of this internal machinery was external-
ized in linguistic communication, expressed acoustically or visu-
ally. I nonetheless hope that the account will prove of value by
taking away a small part of the mystery of the origin of language.
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